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1. The global crisis and changes in sovereign debt patterns 
 
Globalization and liberalization of trade and free capital movement have 
proved to be factors, although we can not say that they have caused, but at least 
favoured the uncontrolled spread of financial derivatives, including bad mortgages-
backed securities, which became “toxic” assets. The turbulences on the 
international financial markets arising from the US housing market crisis which 
emerged in July 2007 have turned drastic in the second half of 2008. Despite 
expectations of an intervention by the Federal Reserves and / or the U.S. 
government for its rescue, only one week after the nationalization of Fannie Mae 
and Freddy Mac, two giants of the financial world, at mid-September 2008 the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers, a reference name on capital markets, has been 
left to fall into bankruptcy, which has degenerated into the slump of the stock 
exchanges capitalization indices all over the world. The secondary capital markets, 
respectively, their indexes of market capitalization, have suffered a fall down up to 
20 percent in only a few weeks (end of September and the first half of October in 
2008).  
Investors’ confidence in the capability of markets to automatically adjust its 
dysfunctions has drastically fallen and the risk of unemployment and poverty as 
consequences of the global crisis could severely damage the political and social 
framework, particularly in the less developed countries.  
In the absence of adequate financial transactions control and supervision of 
global risk monitoring and warning, the protection systems at the national level 
have failed one after the other, opposing a low resistance to the crisis force of 
expansion and contagion. It is worth mentioning that, during the years leading up to 
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the crisis, the monetary axe of the planet dangerously slipped from the West to the 
East, under the pressures of global financial imbalance deepening due to the 
accumulation, one the one hand, of huge international reserves in Asia (mainly 
China and Japan) and, on the other hand, of huge debt in the USA, which generated 
uncontrolled capital flows movements.     
Looking in the recent past, this phenomenon, becoming more visible since 
2005, raised serious concerns in the years 2006 and 2007, when numerous 
multilateral consultations between representatives of China, the Euro Zone, Japan, 
Saudi Arabia and the USA took place under the IMF umbrella. But the attempts of 
coordination of major countries economic and monetary policies in order to restore 
the global imbalances have not led to concrete results, primarily due to divergent 
positions of China and the USA.  
Commenting on the BIS Annual Report 2005, Wermuth (2005) showed that 
this important financial institution, otherwise highly aware of the factors that led to 
global financial imbalances, admitted that foreseeing the ways for their addressing 
proved almost impossible as no one fully understand the interactions between the 
real economy and the financial sector, especially the complex processes triggered 
by a financial bubble, as happen following the housing bubble bust in the USA. 
As observed by Mussa (2005) the cumulative effect of the USA current 
account deficits exceeded on average 3% of GDP over the past 30 years, 
transforming the USA since 2004 from the largest creditor in the world's largest 
debtor. Thus, if in the mid-1970s, the net foreign assets exceeded 25% of the USA 
GDP in the mid-2000s the situation was reversed to a position in which net foreign 
liabilities exceeded 25% of GDP. He estimated that if current account deficits 
continue to be around 5% of GDP the external debtor position of the USA will 
reach 50% of GDP in a period of 10 years and will exceed 100% of GDP in a 
period of 25 years. Given the lack of sustainability of this perspective, Mussa 
concluded that, sooner or later, in one way or other, a downward correction of these 
imbalances should occur. The biggest challenge was therefore avoiding a disorderly 
and uncontrolled correction of the US external balance, which would disrupt the 
financial markets triggering a contraction of the global economic activity. This risk 
materialized only a few years later because of the excessive accumulation of budget 
and current account imbalances in the USA. 
In the years that preceded the global crisis, it became evident that threats to 
the international monetary system functionality came, paradoxically, from the 
North American continent, just from where it was designed and monitored. Thus, it 
was recognized that the main vulnerability of the world financial balance had the 
root in the deterioration of the USA current account balance, Rodrigo de Rato 
(2006), the IMF Managing Director at the time, pointing out that the huge deficits 
recorded by the United States are not sustainable.  
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Surprisingly, it was found that the United States current account deficits 
were financed mainly by private investors which are targeting, as first priority, the 
return on investment, sometimes speculative, being not guided by any strategic 
state reason, which explains also the unpredictable movements of the financial 
flows. As shown by Rajan (2005) as the period of adjusting the USA current 
account deficit is longer, the more financial assets would have to be bought by 
foreign investors, which increased the risks of global imbalances widening.  
In 2006, just one year before the outbreak of the financial crisis, Timothy 
Geithner, the current United States Secretary of the Treasury, then head of the New 
York FED, stated that the USA financial system was stronger than ever and that the 
appropriate management of key institutions made them less vulnerable to shocks 
they had suffered in recent decades. However, he warned that improving the USA 
fiscal position is proved absolutely necessary, given the high volatility of assets 
prices. Geithner pointed out that, under these circumstances, identifying the drivers 
of international capital flows and the related gap in saving-investment ratio in 
countries which led to the deepening of global financial imbalance became of 
crucial importance for economic policy makers in their attempt to assess its impact 
on the growth prospects. 
Before the crisis started, among others, Cline (2007) drew attention as 
concerns the lack of sustainability of persistent United States budget and current 
account deficits, including of the rising public debt, at least for three reasons: first, 
the risk of the USA recession and possible, of the global economy, under the 
impact of falling dollar and implicitly of investor confidence; second, the effects of 
consumption contraction through the correction of the current account deficit and 
third, the increased protectionism under the trade deficit pressure, penalizing in fact 
the low competitiveness of the American manufacturing sector. As shown by 
Ferrero (2007) the rise in the USA external imbalance in the last three decades was 
due also to the link, less visible, between fiscal deficits and the long term trend of 
the trade balance. 
 
In order to restore the world financial stability and to avoid the collapse of 
global economy, a number of leading banks and financial institutions in difficulty 
have been saved, at least temporarily, by the state intervention in USA, UK, 
Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and other countries, through bailout rescue 
packages amounting to almost USD 5,000 billion. These huge public costs 
suggested the need for a systemic plan in order to strengthen financial institutions, 
taking into account the fact that certain actions fragmentized at the national level 
may prove ineffective. Thus, a more intensive cooperation of the stakeholders in 
the stabilization and consolidation of financial markets seem appropriate, 
particularly for the implementation of reforms on regulation and supervision of 
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financial markets. Any postponement of the implementation of reforms in this area 
may prove counterproductive in the medium and long run. 
The turbulences in international financial markets and their negative effects 
triggered a contraction of the world economy in 2009, estimated at 0.6 percent 
(IMF, 2010), more sharp in the USA (2.4 percent), Euro area (4.1 percent) and 
Japan (5.2 percent). Influent international institutions or organizations (including 
UN, World Bank, IMF, EU, etc.), during various high level meetings of the 
Member States have discussed and agreed on a series of measures for counteracting 
the effects of the crisis and restoring the confidence in financial markets. Although 
we can not say that there is a miracle solution ("one-size-fits all"), some of the 
experts have envisaged the consistent, clear and coordinated approach of the issues 
of security bank liabilities, separation of bad assets and recapitalization of the 
institutions concerned. The idea of systemic plans for safeguarding the financial 
markets by increasing the prudence, the supervision and the institutional regulation 
is more and more accredited. From this viewpoint clearly emerges the role of 
public - private partnerships in the financial sector, reducing the rate of 
exclusiveness of regulation solely by the market forces.  
To understand and motivate better possible responses, the effects of the crisis 
according to their action on short and respectively on long term should be 
considered apart, this issue depending on the duration of the crisis on the one hand 
and its economic and social consequences on the other hand. In analyzing the 
effects of the crisis in the context of coherent anti-crisis programs and measures, 
not only their negative side but also the opportunities created by the process of 
"creative destruction" should be highlighted.  
Putting in place emergency measures such as the limitation of the borrowing 
through specific means is meant more to overcome the financial crisis in the short 
term. Instead, the implementation of structural reforms of the global financial 
system on long-term aims at the prevention of recurrence of such crisis phenomena 
in the future and requires special measures. A better regulatory and monitoring 
framework should be designed to help the speeding up of financial innovation for 
the benefit of everybody and not for speculative purposes, by favouring a social 
minority.  
On the agenda of the governments, as challenges for debates and exchange 
of experiences, pointing to a long run horizon are, to varying degrees, financial 
issues related to competition, incentives for prudent behaviour, consumers’ 
protection, the improvement of financial education and of corporate governance.  
At the global level, on the occasion of the high level Summit of G-20 
(Washington, November 2008), the Member Countries committed to an Action 
Plan which was reviewed at G-20 London Summit in April 2009. The Action Plan 
set recommendations in order to strengthen transparency and accountability, 
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enhance sound regulation, promote integrity in financial markets, reinforce 
international cooperation and reform international financial institutions.  
During the G-20 Summit which was held in 24-25th September at Pittsburgh 
(USA) the world leaders recognized that the process of world recovery and repair 
was incomplete, in many countries unemployment remaining unacceptably high 
and the private demand being still weak. As a consequence, they agreed further 
actions to assure a sound recovery from the global economic and financial crisis, 
between them: launching a Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth, setting timetables for the reform of global financial system, mainly by 
raising capital standards and ending practices that lead to excessive risk-taking, 
establishing the Financial Stability Board at the G-20 level, in order to coordinate 
and monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation. European leaders 
discussed also the idea of an EU institution charged with the coordinated financial 
supervision of capital markets in Europe (watchdog) getting some politicians 
express their concern about the functioning of the market economy, in terms of 
intervention measures and protectionist constraints, including the banking system. 
The powers of a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and European System 
of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) still have to be agreed upon and defined in detail. 
Despite the unity of action displayed by the European leaders, there is an 
impression that, in fact, each one is trying to minimize the negative effects on their 
own account, within their national space.  
Considering the effects of the international crisis and viewing the persistence 
of the global financial imbalance, ECOFIN (2009) warned United States as 
concerns the need to increase the saving rate, fostering a gradual but major change 
in the global demand from regions which are recording current account deficits 
toward those with surpluses. In the context of debates on the re-industrialization of 
the United States and on returning to an export-oriented economic model, it is 
important to reveal that, in order to reduce the current account deficits, a key 
objective of the Obama administration is doubling exports of goods and services by 
2015. Thus, under the National Export Initiative, an export council near the White 
House (which includes also top-managers of the largest United States companies) 
has been established, aimed at enhancing the trade missions, improving the access 
to financing (also by supplementing the Eximbank funds), removing the trade 
barriers and promoting the exports in emergent markets, with particular emphasis 
on China and Russia. 
The anti-crisis programs launched by most countries have focused mainly on 
the injection of public funds in the banking and financial sector, bailing out entities 
with big liquidity problems (including the temporary takeover of their toxic assets) 
and, on policies for supporting the domestic demand (investment and / or 
consumption), as major driver of GDP, given the general compression of external 
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demand. The massive intervention of the state in implementing these programs, 
which required a substantial increase in public spending, combined with lower 
budget incomes because of the economic downturn led to fiscal deficit widening 
and to public debt increase. It is estimated that, in advanced countries, where this 
state intervention came about into a larger extent, the public debt will reach 120% 
of GDP in 2015, compared to around 80% as recorded in the pre-crisis years. 
Moreover, if in early 2010, the economic recovery appeared to have a high 
degree of certainty, the discussions focusing on the optimal timing of exit  policies, 
at the middle of this year its sustainability was being questioned, the G-20 leaders 
meeting in Toronto in late June 2010 highlighting the confrontation between two 
diametrically opposed approaches: on the one hand, United States and some other 
countries which promoted further support for the economic growth, despite public 
debt increase and on the other hand, Germany (the EU flagship) which sustained 
austerity policies and fiscal consolidation, despite negative effects on the economic 
recovery. Failing to agree on a consistent formula for a new global financial 
regulatory framework, the world leaders, recognizing the priority of strengthening 
the recovery process and of creating the foundations for achieving a strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth, have reached, at least declaratively, a 
compromise solution as concerns implementing fiscal measures in order to ensure 
the public debt reduction by 2015 and to stabilize or reduce the public debt to GDP 
ratio by 2016. 
As shown in recent IMF report on the world economy prospects (IMF, 2010) 
the success of fiscal consolidation is difficult to be expected without achieving a 
strong economic growth, so that advanced countries facing hard budgetary 
constraints and high level of the public debt are advised to undertake a tax reform, 
in the sense of policy responses aimed to encourage investments, increase the 
growth potential and improve the competitiveness. 
In our opinion, without a radical reform of the global financial system, 
involving hard regulations (especially on international transactions and on financial 
derivative circuit) that eliminate the causes that triggered the crisis in 2007, the 
outbreak of a new crisis is anytime possible, with devastating effects at the 
planetary level, much more under the circumstances of the inability of full 
absorption of the current recession and instability costs, including unemployment 
and social problems.   
It should be mentioned that in July 2010, after long debates in the Congress 
and Senate, a law quoted as being of historic importance, which brings the most 
profound changes in the United States financial system from the 1930s New Deal 
was approved. This complex law (more than 2300 pages) also known as “Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform” aims to avoid triggering another financial crisis by 
strengthening of systemic risk supervision and monitoring, including the 
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consolidation or creation of authorities/institutions/bodies in this respect, new 
regulations on companies too-big-to-fail (which will have to assume the costs of a 
possible bankruptcy), the introduction of more severe prudential standards and 
imposing limits on market concentration. 
Other regulations, particularly on retail banking operations, consist in 
strengthening the financial products consumer protection, especially in terms of 
costs (fees and commissions) of these products which are to be standardized. An 
important segment of financial markets, derivatives, largely unregulated, which 
favoured the outbreak and spread of the international crisis, will be subject to strict 
supervision and transparency of transactions. Of course, as shown also by Lester 
and Bovenzi (2010), given the amendments of the law over the approval 
procedures, many of the regulations could prove unsustainable facing the financial 
markets realities and others, in the absence of their verification, may have 
unpredictable side effects. 
The reality is that the economy of developed countries has been kept alive 
artificially, by its intubation to the future resources of the states (public debt), in 
many cases without recovering the health of the financial system and addressing 
the competitiveness deficit against emerging economies (especially China). 
Moreover, in addition to the risks of adverse developments in international markets 
of goods and services, there are new threats related to the excessive size of public 
debt in advanced countries, leading to the deterioration of sovereign risk.  
As recently stated M. Portugal (2010), deputy director of IMF, unresolved 
issues related to fiscal and debt sustainability in the advanced countries, especially 
in Europe, can undermine their economic recovery and even threaten the global 
financial stability. The fiscal vulnerabilities of these countries fall under the 
incidence of sovereign risk assessment, firstly by their rating downgraded which 
lead to the increase in governmental bonds volatility and secondly by higher yield 
spread of these bonds which increased the costs of debt financing/refinancing. The 
deterioration of sovereign risk in some European countries has occurred as the 
direct effect of the crisis, because of worsened economic and social parameters, and 
as a result of increased public exposure to private risks by the state taking over of 
the debt of private companies or financial institutions. 
Also, Das and others (2010), mentioning that the economic literature does 
not pay enough attention to examining the impact of sovereign risk on capital flows 
and on corporate market access, highlighted the finding that the situation of a 
country payment default lead to the exclusion of that country from the international 
private financial markets for an average of 5 years, the deviations from this average 
depending on changes in sovereign risk and in budgetary balance.  
A retrospective overview of the financial crisis undertaken by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) has revealed that from 1800 to 2006 there have been many historical 
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periods characterized by sovereign debt crises, the most dramatic and extended 
effects being generated on account of the global conflagrations. They found that, 
however, other factors (the price of several goods and/or the interest rates in major 
countries) have played a role in crisis occurrence at sovereign level. In modern 
times, a factor constantly found in generating crisis is related to the precedence of 
large capital inflows, both at a country and regional or global scale. Thus, as shown 
by the cited authors, in periods of high capital mobility have repeatedly emerged 
international banking crises, as happened in the 1990s (in Latin America, Russia, 
Asia). Also, empirical tests for a number of 66 countries led to the conclusion that 
other factors related to sovereign debt crisis are the domestic public debt (with a 
major risk in case of exceeding 30% of GDP), high inflation (over 20% annually) 
in conjunction with currency crisis. 
Manasse and others (2003) showed that the occurrence of sovereign debt 
crises can be predictable if the evolution of macroeconomic factors is closely 
examined, for example, a high level of external debt to GDP increasing the 
likelihood of entry into the payments default. However, even under the 
circumstances of a low level of debt, a country may have an increased risk of 
entering into the financial crisis if is facing liquidity problems or if the external 
environment is unfavourable. In the view of cited authors, other macroeconomic 
variables important for the predictability of crisis, are a slow GDP  growth rate, 
current account deficits, a low degree of trade openness, inappropriate fiscal and 
monetary management and also political uncertainties (particularly in years the 
presidential elections are held). 
As seen in a recent report issued by the international rating agency Fitch 
(2010), the most severe deterioration in public finances in the EU Member States 
has been in countries characterized by highly leveraged private sector, with the 
notable exception of Greece, where the main cause of the crisis was the bad 
management of the public finances and the loss of credibility in front of foreign 
investors. According to Fitch experts, the public debt to GDP ratio in EU-27 
countries will increase from 70% in pre-crisis period to more than 100% in 2011, 
about one third of this increase being caused by the so-called fiscal stabilizers 
(including crisis responses) enabled during the recession.  
Given that public finances are a key element of sovereign risk, on the other 
hand it was found that often the banking crisis occurs at the same time with 
sovereign debt crisis, both as its cause and / or effect. 
The global crisis of 2008-2009 brought a major change from the perspective 
of a sovereign debt crisis, which was evaluated by now possible only in 
underdeveloped or emerging countries. The persistence of domestic debt, 
exacerbated following the impact of the global crisis has proved that advanced 
countries are not spared the risk of entering into a situation of payment default.  
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2. Theory and practice in assessing debt sustainability  
 
In the economic literature, but also in the international practice there is some 
consensus on the idea that, in developing countries, depending on the efficiency of 
external loans / credits, reasonable levels of external indebtedness may help the 
economic growth by the accumulation of capital and by the productivity growth. 
On the other hand, the over-indebtedness, that is a high level of external debt on 
medium and long term, potentially unsustainable, can be a brake on technological 
progress of that country, having adverse effects on growth, the transmission 
channel being visible upon the public investment and the physical capital 
accumulation. An excessive burden of the external debt is acting in a vicious circle, 
i.e. the higher the degree of indebtedness the more complicated the process of 
economy financing becomes, including supplementary costs of debt refinancing, 
which finally could even lead to blocking the economic growth of that country and 
to slip into default.  
Some studies have estimated that, for countries with an average degree of 
indebtedness, doubling the debt is reducing the annual growth by 1 percentage 
point in the long term (Pattillo and others, 2004).  
The analysis of non-linearity in the relationship external debt-economic 
growth has pointed out that, at low levels of debt / GDP ratio, there is a positive 
influence on growth but at high levels of this ratio a negative impact has been 
revealed. The analysis of the data for a group of countries during 1968-1998, 
showed that the average impact of debt on GDP per capita growth becomes 
negative at levels of 160-170 percent of debt to exports ratio and of 35-40 percent 
of debt to GDP ratio. According to other studies (B. Clements and others, 2003), 
the negative marginal effects on growth start to occur at levels even lower of public 
and publicly guaranteed external debt, i.e. at 20-25 percent of GDP.  
The over-dimensioning of debt is producing "overhang effects" on economic 
growth by discouraging investment (as level and structure) due to a possible threat 
of increasing taxes in the future, under the constraints of debt repayment 
obligations, which would affect the ex-ante efficiency parameters related to those 
investments (see Hennessy, 2004). The same effects can affect the macroeconomic 
stability because of the currency depreciation, of the fiscal deficit increase, of 
inflation and of uncertainties induced by the high level of indebtedness (Arnone 
and others, 2005).  
Stopping or slowing debt growth as a form of external debt relief should be 
taken into consideration by the decision makers for the next years. This approach is 
totally in contrast with non-altruistic politicians and groups of interest concerned 
rather with their narrow and short-term objectives than with improving wellbeing. 
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The politicians are inclined to finance their short-term particular interest of re-
election by booming the consumption or meeting the pressure of short-term 
requirements of the economy salvation. 
 The 200-year-old concept in economics of “Ricardian equivalence”2 
supported by a reduced but outstanding number of economists holds under certain 
conditions:  
 the presence of the so-called altruist intergenerational decision makers who 
consider that a debt redistributes resources from future to current generation;  
 the intergenerational transfer have not to be detrimental to future generation ; 
 the existence of perfect capital markets which is not the case in our times of 
rapid changes; 
 the presence of non-distortionary (lump sum) taxation (a distortionary 
taxation reduces incentives to invest or work, the level of distortions growing 
with the higher tax increase). 
 When most debt is denominated in foreign currency, higher levels of debt are 
generating constrains on the conduct of an independent monetary policy. The 
public debt management has to design policies aiming at reducing vulnerability of 
volatile capital markets, costly debt and financial crisis.  
Although rising indebtedness is directly linked to the increase of default risk, 
some studies show that the debt level is not the crucial factor of sovereign debt risk 
(Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelphenning, 2003). The quality of national 
economy, of political and institutional bodies and of the governance is among the 
most important debt factors. 
High debt levels are not associated with robust long-term growth in case 
high-return investment projects are not guaranteed. The complex interaction 
between economic growth and foreign debt has to be evaluated through the 
potential rate of investment returns. A higher investment return will generate a 
country’s better off and the necessary means to repay the debt obligations.  
The defining elements of a sovereign debt crisis scenario manifested as the 
situation of non-payment of due amounts at a given maturity are the downgrading 
of the country rating, the currency crisis, the calling for loans from the IMF, the 
foreign capital flight. Typically, this crisis is followed (sometimes preceded) by a 
restructuring or rescheduling of the external debt. The problems of external 
payments overheating is affecting also the private sector, limiting its access to the 
capital markets and raising the borrowing costs. On the other hand, neither of the 
pressures related to external payments could be without impact on economic 
growth on different time horizons. 
                                                  
2 According to Ricardo a government’s debt-financed tax cut is leading to higher taxes in the 
future meaning only a postponement and not a reduction in the overall tax volume 
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After 1990, when many emerging countries received access to the 
international capital markets, the risk that a sovereign debt crisis of a particular 
country to cause chain reactions has increased considerably, as happened in the 
case of Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, when the effect of payment difficulties 
arising in Thailand have spread in almost all region. Wrongful government actions 
have reputation effects on confidence, affecting not only the sovereign debt, but 
also the international trade and investments, an entry in payment crisis inducing 
catastrophic effects on that country, as shown in the model of Cole and Kehoe 
(1998).  
So, the main issue to prevent and avoid a payment crisis situation at 
sovereign level is to accurately assess the risk of default, respectively the debt 
sustainability. By sustainability, in this case, is understood an external financial 
situation of a country where foreign exchange resources are beyond the external 
debt service payments obligations. The longer the time horizon of the evaluation is 
which corresponds better to the purpose of analysis is, the more difficult it 
becomes, due to the multiplication factors of uncertainty.  
Under the common framework of the IMF and World Bank methodology 
(IMF, 2008), the debt sustainability analysis, applicable for the public and highly 
indebted countries, is built on 3 pillars:  
I. Analysis of debt dynamics and prospects of debt service in the context 
of a baseline scenario, the alternative scenarios and stress tests standardized. 
Alternative scenarios have in view the assessment of country's vulnerabilities to 
deviations from the baseline scenario and to various plausible shocks. 
Methodologically, the external debt covers only the long-term, is defined on the 
basis of residence and may include the domestic debt denominated in foreign 
currency (especially in the case of countries where its level is very high).  
II. Debt sustainability assessment based on debt service in relation with 
measuring the ability to pay. Debt stock indicators provide a measure of the total 
future debt burden, estimated by measuring its present value at a certain discount 
rate and the ability to pay is measured by GDP, exports of goods and services and / 
or budget revenues. Debt service indicators (at present value, discounted at a 
constant rate) relative to exports, respectively budget revenues, is reflecting the 
burden of future payment obligations of a country, highlighting the risks of 
insolvency in the long term and providing an indication of the likelihood of 
locating in time of the liquidity problems. The perspective considered takes into 
account the debt maturity, which is of 10-20 years.  
III. Recommendations on the borrowing strategy in order to limit the risk 
of payment problems, risk rated according to how the external debt present and 
future indicators are related to the thresholds of the base scenario, alternative 
scenarios and stress tests, thus:  
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- Low risk: all the indicators are well below the thresholds. If one indicator 
is above a certain threshold should be checked if it is a problem of sustainability;  
- Moderate risk: when the base scenario indicates an exceeding of the 
thresholds and the alternative scenarios or stress tests show a significant increase in 
the level of debt service indicators on the projected period;  
- High risk: base scenario indicates an exceeding of thresholds of debt and / 
or debt service, and alternative scenarios or stress tests also show an exacerbation 
of level indicators;  
- Statement of payment problems: debt and debt service ratio are 
significantly above the thresholds; the existence of payments delays suggests that 
the country is in default, except when there are other reasons than the burden of 
debt service for which payments are not made.  
Starting from the fact that sustainable levels of external debt are influenced 
by the quality of policies and institutions, to assess their performance the World 
Bank calculates CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) Index on the 3 
categories of countries (with strong, medium and weak policy), the final 
classification in the various categories of risk depending also on the score obtained 
on this index.  
According to some opinions (D. Gray and others, 2008), traditional analysis 
of external debt sustainability, has a number of weaknesses due to the fact that a 
growth of the debt / GDP ratio does not necessarily mean an unsustainable debt 
dynamics. Moreover, the stabilization of the debt / GDP ratio is not sufficient if, for 
example, the level at which it stabilizes is too high (possibly unsustainable). Some 
studies have shown that the threshold of sustainability of external debt for the 
emerging countries ranges from 15-20 percent to 50-60 percent of GDP, whereas 
for the developed countries it can rise up to 350 percent of GDP, with an average of 
85 percent (Reinhart and others, 2003).  
The traditional approach does not take into account the level and the changes 
in public sector assets and liabilities that affect the sustainability of debt and does 
not consider also the international reserves level. In defining the macroeconomic 
parameters that determine the debt sustainability, it does not take into account the 
volatile nature of markets, and it is based on assumptions regarding the evolution of 
the economic growth, the real interest rates and the exchange rates. The markets 
volatility may increase both on account of political shocks and the exogenous 
shocks and a higher volatility in emerging countries compared with the advanced 
countries may be due to their limited ability to increase taxes and to their uncertain 
tax base. As Catao and Kapur (2006) pointed out, the external volatility of 
international trade has also a significant impact on the likelihood of payments 
default.  
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The experiences of many countries concerning the external debt 
sustainability suggests that, for monitoring the vulnerability to insolvency, currency 
and liquidity risks, analysing the debt structure depending on interest rates and 
currency composition is extremely important. It was noted that, for example, 
economies that have a higher share of debt with variable interest rate in the total 
debt are more vulnerable to sudden increases in interest rates. In recent years, 
fluctuations in exchange rates, especially of the U.S. dollar (in the sense of its 
depreciation) have created relevance problems concerning the level of the overall 
external debt denominated in a particular currency. Consequently, it considers that 
information on the composition by currency and interest rates are absolutely 
necessary for a correct assessment of debt sustainability, through an appropriate 
currency conversion, respectively by calculating a weighted average of interest due 
on that debt, respectively.   
An appropriate public debt management requires consistent management of 
risks associated with debt portfolio, respectively refinancing risk (the inability to 
refinance debt or excessive increase its costs), currency risk (increase in foreign 
debt due to currency depreciation), interest rate risk (rise in interest on domestic or 
international capital markets), credit risk (bankruptcy of counterparts), the payment 
risk (errors in the payment system), operational risk (error of debt management 
system or human error, lack of appropriate procedures, lack of staff) and legislative 
risk (interpretation of the law).  
The countries’ responses to the crisis (including measures to increase public 
investments, tax relieve, financial packages supporting companies and / or financial 
and banking institutions with liquidity problems etc.) allowed, to a large extent, the 
absorption of the global crisis effects and the economic recovery starting with the 
last part of 2009. But the costs of these programs have a deep impact on the public 
debt, which, for example, in EU countries has increased, as a proportion of GDP, 
from 61.5 percent in 2008 to 73 percent in 2009, for 2010 being estimated to reach 
almost 80 percent. The case of Greece, which accumulated almost EUR 300 billion 
public debt (117 percent of GDP) at the end of 2009, became dramatic during the 
first months of 2010, without the financial assistance from EU and IMF, risking an 
exit from Euro-zone and even a sovereign debt default.  
In the Euro Area is raising the concern about the contagion effects of the 
sovereign risk increase, due to similarity of fiscal vulnerabilities between different 
countries. The international rating agency Moody’s, after successive downgrades of 
Greece sovereign rating in 2009 and early 2010, at the middle of this year, Moody's 
downgraded also the rating of Portugal and Ireland. On the account of linkages 
between the public sector and the banking system, considering the problems 
emerged recently in Spain, one could expect an increase in sovereign risk also in 
this case. In this context, it should be mentioned that EU decided to create its own 
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rating agency as expression of its angry against the degrading of Greece rating into 
junk status by S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, which led to the worsening of the debt 
crisis of this Member state, with reverberations throughout the Euro Area, 
threatening also the future of euro. 
In order to prevent the occurrence of sovereign debt crisis, the Euro Area 
countries agreed in June 2010 on creating the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), a special purpose vehicle which may borrow up to EUR 440 billion to 
Member States in difficulty, becoming operational in September 2010 and 
contributing to the financial rescue package for Greece (EUR 110 billion over a 
period of three years). 
 
3. Romania’s vulnerabilities and the increase in financing 
requirements 
 
The global crisis has severely affected the real economy, in 2009 the gross 
domestic product of Romania falling by 7.1 percent compared with 2008. The 
exports fell by almost 14 percent and the imports by 32 percent. The manufacturing 
sector, whose main branches are under the majority control of foreign capital and 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations, being more exposed to international 
markets, witnessed a 6.5 percent contraction. Constructions and retail trade 
registered also a sharp decline (more than 15 percent and respectively 10 percent) 
in comparison with their "boom" in previous periods. The financial sector recorded 
a significant fall (more than 5 percent). Even bankruptcies of banks did not emerge 
the lending activity entered a deadlock.  
The financial framework of Romania, both internal and external, deteriorate 
under the pressure of the state budget widening due to diminishing revenues and 
rising public sector expenditure and of the decline of foreign exchange incomes due 
to the falling exports. 
The biggest challenge for the prospects of Romania’s development is related, 
in our view, to the sustainability of the external financial situation revealed by the 
evolution of external debt both on short term and medium and long term (see Table 
1).  
Under the circumstances of falling contribution of the autonomous flows 
(foreign direct investments) for covering the current account deficit and the 
increase of compensatory flows (external loans), the medium and long term 
external debt of Romania has risen more than three times over the last six years, 
exceeding EUR 51.7 billion at the end of 2008. The short-term external debt has 
increased even faster, almost seven times in six years, mainly due to the boom in 
imports and consumption credit. But an excessive rise of the short-term external 
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debt put great pressure on the currency market, risking a crash of the national 
currency in 2009.  
 
Table 1  
     The short, medium and long term external debt of Romania in the  
     period 2003-2009  
         - EUR billion - 
External debt 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TOTAL 18.4 21.5 30.9 41.2 58.3 72.4 80.1 
-  short term 2.7 3.2 6.3 12.6 19.8 20.6 14.6 
- medium and 
long term 
15.7 18.3 24.6 28.6 38.5 51.8 65.5 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Interactive Databank. 
 
On the other hand, the accumulation of a large foreign debt in the medium 
and long run, accompanied by high levels of annual services, weakened the 
international position of Romania, undermining its sustainable development. The 
medium and long term external debt of Romania continued to grow in 2009, mainly 
due to the loan from IMF and other international organizations, reaching EUR 65.5 
billion at the end of December. 
To deal with the financial difficulties in 2009, stressed by the consequences 
of the global crisis, Romania has concluded a financing agreement for a two-year 
loan of EUR 20 billion with IMF, EU, EBRD and World Bank, under the 
conditions of reducing the budget deficit and freezing wages in the public sector. 
Regarded as a "safety belt", the loan was intended to support the budget deficit and 
economic activity, to maintain the euro-lei exchange rates at sustainable levels for 
the economy and population and to boost the recovery of lending activity. The 
financial assistance and the economic policies are supposed to cope with liquidity 
pressures in the short term, to improve competitiveness and to redress the 
macroeconomic and financial imbalances.  
The real causes of the accelerated increase in Romania’s external financing 
requirements are related to growing vulnerabilities of the financial situation which 
resulted from macroeconomic imbalances deepening, particularly the savings-
investments balance, from  pressures on external balance of payments emerged in 
recent years due to the deterioration of the current account and to the widening of 
trade deficit. The excessive increase in domestic private credit for consumption has 
fuelled the massive increase of imports, mainly in 2007 and 2008. At the same 
time, reducing the relative contribution of foreign direct investment to financing the 
current account deficit has lead to the increase in the short-term and medium-long 
term external debt, mostly in the private sector (including banks).  
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The deterioration of the current account during the last years is also 
explained by the slowing of current transfers from the Romanians working abroad 
and the increase in the income balance deficit, especially due to growing profits 
repatriation and/or reinvested by the foreign companies and also to increased 
interests related to the external debt. All these were accompanied by a modest rate 
of EU funds absorption in the first years of accession (about 10 percent), despite its 
relatively low level of development, Romania being a net contributor to the EU 
budget, for several years.  
The gross financing requirements for 2009 estimated by the IMF and the 
National Bank of Romania, stood for EUR 44 billion, from which a financial gap of 
around EUR 12 billion  has resulted to be covered by an external loan, was not 
adequately sustained in our view, at least according to published - sometimes 
contradictory or confusing - information.  
For example, the estimation for foreign direct investments, respectively EUR 
3.5 billion in 2009, has proved to be under-sized, compared with the previous year 
(EUR 9 billion) and also with the real amount of FDI registered at the end of 2009 
(EUR 4.9 billion).  
In our opinion, under the circumstances of many uncertainties in the 
international environment, which could have assumed also the rebound of the 
world economy since 2010, a financing agreement over a shorter period would 
have been more appropriate. In case the pessimistic assumptions on the Romanian 
economy would have been confirmed, an extension of this agreement could have 
been negotiated. However, a much more advantageous financing solution for 
Romania, as an EU member state, would have been the qualification for obtaining a 
credit line on 6 months or one year from FCL (“Flexible Credit Line”), a funding 
modality initiated by the IMF in the month of March 2009 replacing SLF (“Short 
Term Liquidity Facility”). This new credit line is released for the prevention of 
crises in countries with very strong fundamentals, policies, and track records of 
policy implementation, which is not totally the case of Romania.  
In fact, in our view, the logic of the agreement with the IMF was based on 
monetary coordinates designed inside the National Bank of Romania perimeter. 
Starting with the top priority of Romania's accession to the Euro aria in 2014 and 
thus of its entry into the ERM II (Exchange Rate Mechanism) in 2012, the strict 
conformity to convergence criteria (in particular those on inflation, nominal interest 
rates on long term and exchange rate) has become the fundamental objective in the 
medium and long run.  
The threat of a possible collapse of the national currency in the spring of 
2009, due to internal and external pressures accumulation doubled by the lack of 
immediate liquidity of assets in which the international reserves of Romania have 
been invested and also by the reduction of the minimum reserve requirements on 
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foreign currency liabilities of the commercial banks could have triggered an 
uncontrolled inflation, missing the target of joining the Euro area.  
The inconsistency of tax and fiscal policies and of high budgetary 
expenditures level in 2008 has worried the monetary authorities of Romania, but 
also the European Commission. Under these circumstances, the central bank has 
been forced to resort to international arbitration for imposing the national fiscal 
discipline under a multilateral financing agreement: IMF, EU, EBRD and World 
Bank.  
The Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF brought a number of positive 
expectations for Romania, implementing the necessary fiscal and monetary 
policies, including the fiscal discipline, ensuring the macroeconomic stability in the 
context of conditionality and performance criteria, improving the perception of 
foreign investors, stabilizing the foreign exchange market, ameliorating the 
predictability, sustainability and coherence of economic policies, supporting the 
banking sector and its strengthening, including the recovery of the lending activity, 
both for businesses and population.  
Beyond these expectations, there are also several risks arising from the 
agreement with the IMF, such as creating a negative image regarding the financial 
situation of Romania, which would make a "bailout" necessary, limiting the 
government room of manoeuvre in the implementation of various economic 
policies, including the predictable reduction of the budget allocation in accordance 
with national priorities, such as infrastructure development, export promotion and 
environment protection. The loan of about EUR 20 billion will push the external 
debt towards excessive levels, with annual services potentially unsustainable in the 
medium and long run. The social effects generated by the loss of jobs, accompanied 
by the non-indexation of wages and pensions, can have adverse economic costs that 
are difficult to estimate. Any non-conformation of Romania to the conditions and 
performance criteria specified in the agreement, which involves postponements or 
worse, cancellation of the next instalments, could lead to adverse effects on the 
economy, including on the prospects of sovereign risk.  
A weak point of the procedures backing the agreement with the IMF stood 
for the lack of an alternative, for example compared with a loan from another 
country and/or with a launch of Romanian government bonds on national and 
international capital markets, considered too restrictive a priori. In this context, the 
comparative terms of loans could have been made known, so that one can be sure 
that the most advantageous borrowing alternative has been chosen. In this way, 
speculations around the conditionalities imposed by IMF and the confidentiality of 
certain clauses of the agreement could have been avoided, more under the 
circumstances of increasing the financial system transparency, considered as a 
primary remedy for its recovery. 
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According to the first review of Stand-By Arrangement, the report of IMF 
staff team, following discussions with the Romanian authorities ended at mid-
August 2009, underlined the contraction of economic activities sharper than 
projected, due to the combination of an unfavourable external environment and 
faster retrenchment of domestic demand during the first half of 2009. The IMF 
experts brought many significant corrections to the macroeconomic framework 
projected 6 months before, confirming our doubts previously mentioned regarding 
their adequacy. For instance, the new figure for the gross financing requirements 
stood for EUR 41.5 billion (instead of EUR 44 billion) for 2009, respectively EUR 
2.5 billion less, following the corrections of current account deficit (down from 
EUR 9 billion to EUR 6.5 billion).  
The total financing resources were revised from EUR 32.2 billion up to EUR 
34.5 billion, mainly due to the corrections of net foreign direct investments 
estimation from EUR 3.5 billion to EUR 5 billion. The most significant change 
suffered the estimates for the increase of gross international reserves - rather an 
adjustment parameter - respectively from 0 to EUR 4.5 billion, which made the 
external financial gap (EUR 11.5 billion instead of EUR 11.8 billion) to remain 
almost the same, justifying in this way the amount of the loan from the IMF and 
other international organizations. 
 
4. The assessment of Romania’s public and MLT external debt 
sustainability   
 
For Romania, the issue of appropriate management of debt, both internal and 
external, has become of acute importance in recent years, which witnessed a sharp 
growth of indebtedness on the one hand, on the account of considerable budget 
deficits accumulation and on the other hand, due to the direct effects of the global 
crisis, which reduced foreign exchange earnings from exports and caused a 
decrease in FDI inflows, making difficult the financing of the economy and 
imposing a massive sovereign borrowing.  
First, we will examine the evolution of the public debt main indicators, 
trying to assess its sustainability. According to a report of the Ministry of Finance, 
in the period 2000-2009, the total public debt (government and local authorities, 
internal and external, including state guarantees) rose more than three times in real 
terms, reaching about 30 percent of GDP at the end of 2009 (see Table 2).  
Even if this parameter is below the limit set by the Maastricht Treaty (i.e. 60 
percent of GDP), the fact that in just 4 years this share has almost doubled in the 
case of Romania, is a warning signal to the authorities, considering also an 
unfavourable internal economic context, which would rather suggest a further 
increase of the sovereign debt. It is worth mentioning that another indicator of 
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public debt is deteriorating, the ratio between the debt and the exports of goods and 
services exceeding 100 percent in 2009 and falling already, according to 
international standards, in the area of a moderate risk of sustainability problems.  
 
Table 2 
 Indicators of Romania’s public debt sustainability in the period  
          2001-2009 
 
Indicators/Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Public debt (as percentage) 
     - in GDP 




























*For 2009, own estimation 
Source: For 2001-2008, Public Debt Report (in Romanian Language: Raport 
privind Datoria Publică), Ministry of Finance, June 2009; for 2009, data from 
Public Debt Bulletin, Ministry of Finance, December 2009.  
 
As we previously noted, in order to relieve the public debt sustainability, of 
crucial importance proves to be the examination of debt portfolio structure, from 
data on Romania resulting that the main tendencies reflect a deterioration of its 
prospects. Thus, in terms of currency composition, it is noteworthy that, since 
2007, when the public debt denominated in lei, with a total share of 53.2 percent, 
has exceeded for the first time the public debt denominated in foreign currencies, 
especially on the account of increased needs for budget deficit financing, which 
happened also in 2008 and 2009. Although, in principle, this could be interpreted as 
a positive trend due to containing the currency risk, paradoxically, the financing 
costs in national currency were extremely high, especially due to rising inflation 
expectations. The government bonds were issued with a 10 percent annual interest, 
this high level being fuelled also by the volatility on international capital markets.  
On the other hand, changes in the structure of public debt by type of 
financial instruments reveals the effects of the application by the Ministry of 
Finance of a strategy aimed at extending the issue of government bonds and of 
their maturity (on 10, 12 and even 15 years), which  intends also to relax the 
timetable for repayment. In the structure of debt by type of interest rate, there was a 
downward trend of the share of debt with fixed interest rate (to about 30 
percent in 2009) and the corresponding increase of the share of debt with variable 
interest rate, which may affect in perspective the public debt sustainability, 
especially in the case of an unfavourable evolution of financing costs.  
If the evolution of debt structure on categories of creditors is considered, it is 
worth mentioning that the main and growing share (reaching over 80 percent in 
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2009) is held by private banks and other private creditors, this tendency being 
sustained also by the structural changes in debt public on type of financial 
instruments which we have been previously noted. As some studies pointed out 
(Flassbeck and Panizza, 2008) this category of creditors have also the highest risk 
in terms of the MLT debt sustainability (i.e. the likelihood of payment problems 
occurrence at sovereign level).  
In conclusion, it can be said that in recent years, there has been a rapid 
deterioration of the public debt sustainability parameters in Romania, 
including of the loan portfolio structure. The main factor leading to the increase 
in the domestic debt was the budget deficit accumulation, and respectively, of the 
foreign debt rise, due to the borrowing from international organizations (IMF, EU, 
World Bank). It is worth mentioning that the external credit was partially used to 
finance the deficit budget, but also in order to support the currency market and the 
national currency exchange rate. If the measures agreed in the Stand-by agreement 
will bring the expected results, turning back under control the consolidated budget 
deficit, we think that there are not major risks in the short term as concerns 
Romania's public debt sustainability.  
On medium and long run, as estimated by the IMF (2010b, p. 34) in the 
scenario with key variables (including real GDP growth, real interest rate and 
primary balance in percent of GDP) at their historical averages, the gross public 
debt (excluding state guarantees) is foreseen to decrease to 28.3 percent of GDP in 
2015, while in the scenario with no policy change (constant primary balance) an 
increase to 50.1 percent, both alternatives remaining on sustainable path (bellow 
the Maastricht threshold of 60 percent, even on 2020 time horizon, caeteris 
paribus).     
For 2010, while initially a slight economic recovery was foreseen, at mid-
year, taking in account the results in the first months, the forecast was revised 
downwards, a fall in GDP of around 2 percent being expected in this year.  
It should be noted that, in Romania, not the financing of anti-crisis measures 
- in fact, almost nonexistent - has caused the fiscal deficit widening, but rather the 
covering of the financing needs of an overstaffed public sector and of supporting 
the social security budget. Moreover, the poor management of the public finances 
has led to partially blocking the economy through the arrears increasing, 
respectively payments delays to the companies, which generated a chain reaction.  
Under these unfavourable circumstances, instead of maintaining the public 
debt on a sustainable path as IMF projects (between 30 percent and 60 percent of 
GDP), the trend of debt sustainability could take another course in Romania, as 
seen in Figure 1. Thus, we think that delays in economic recovery and budget 
consolidation could lead, while maintaining the current pace of the public debt 
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deterioration, to exceeding the critical threshold of 60 percent of GDP in only 4-5 





































                            
_ _ _ _ IMF Scenario (key variables at their historical averages)                      
______ IMF Scenario (no policy change)                                   
         - - - - - Possible alternative trend (under unfavourable circumstances) 
  
In terms of country risk analysis, the debt sustainability assessment should be 
consistent also with that of the total foreign debt, which, in the case of Romania, 
experienced a dramatic evolution over the past decade.  
According to its structural configuration, the Romanian economy 
development is dependent on imports, implying the deterioration in the trade and 
current account balances, more pronounced with the growth rate is higher.  
As mentioned before, the external debt on medium and long term increased 
from a level below EUR 10 billion in 2000 to EUR 65 billion at the end of 2009. At 
the same time, the short-term external debt increased from a level below EUR 2 
billion in 2000 to over 20 billion EUR in 2008, followed by a decline to about EUR 
15 billion at the end of 2009.  
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In this study we are focusing on the long term sustainability of the external 
financial framework, which does not mean that the short term external debt 
sustainability is less important. 
Our main reasons are that, on the one hand, methodologically, one could not 
analyse the merger of medium and long term debt with the short term debt, because 
of their different nature, and on the other hand, if a short term external balance 
could be, more or less, easily adjusted, on long run the correction becomes much 
more difficult, which is requiring another approach.  
Starting from the fact that the short-term external debt is predominantly 
related to the trade receivables, with limited influence on overall long term 
financial situation of a country, bearing however in mind that Romania has felt 
acutely the short term debt pressures on the currency market in the spring of 2009 - 
which partially motivated the external multilateral financial assistance - we will 
continue our analysis focusing on MLT external debt, seeking an assessment of its 
sustainability.  
As it can be noticed in the data presented in the Table 3 and 4, the main 
parameters for assessing the sustainability of the MLT external debt recorded 
an unfavourable trend in the period 2000-2009, being currently at the limit or 
beyond the threshold of sustainability. 
 
Table 3 
         Indicators of external financial framework of Romania in the  
         period 2000-2009 
 
Indicators/Years 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MLT External Debt (EUR bn) 9.6 18.3 24.6 28.6 38.5 51.8 65.5 
MLT External Debt Service (EUR 
bn) 
2.2 3.8 4.8 6.1 7.5 12.1 11.4 
Gross Domestic Product* (EUR 
bn) 
40.2 60.7 79.7 97.8 123.6 136.
8 
117.0 
GDP real growth (percent) 2.1 8.4 4.1 7.9 6.2 7.1 -7.1 
Exports of Goods &Services (EUR 
bn) 
13.2 21.8 26.4 31.4 36.5 42.4 36.0 
Forex Earnings (EUR bn) 14.7 25.5 31.7 38.7 46.1 53.4 43.8 
Forex Reserves (EUR bn) 5.2 13.1 18.3 22.9 27.2 28.3 30.9 
* For 2009, estimation of the National Commission for Prognosis  
Source: National Bank of Romania, National Commission for Prognosis.  
 
The thresholds proposed by us are indicative, their setting having in view the 
vulnerabilities of Romania in conditions of crisis, considering only partially the 
international standards (mainly, of the rating agencies). Also, we specify that they 
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represent more a zone delimitation (in the sense of warning levels under the 
circumstances of maximum caution) and less a qualification assessment scale.  
The MLT external debt to GDP ratio increased from 23.9 percent to 37.6 
percent in 2008, making a sharper leap in 2009 when this ratio reached 54.9 
percent, it is true that under the circumstances of a GDP contraction by more than 7 
percent this last year.  
 
Table 4 
          Indicators of Romania’s MLT external debt sustainability in the  
          period 2000-2009 
- percent - 
Indicators/Years 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 Threshold 
External Debt /GDP 23.9 29.2 31.1 37.9 56.0 50.0 
External Debt/Exports G&S 72.7 91.2 105.5 122.2 181.9 150.0 
External Debt/ Forex Earnings 65.3 73.9 83.5 97.0 149.5 100.0 
Forex Reserves/External Debt 54.2 80.0 70.6 54.6 47.2 50.0* 
External Debt Service/Forex Earnings 15.0 15.8 16.3 22.7 26.0 20.0 
External Debt Service/Exports G&S 16.7 19.4 20.5 28.5 31.7 30.0 
External Debt Service/Forex Reserves 42.3 26.6 27.6 42.8 36.9 40.0 
Forex Reserves/GDP 12.9 23.4 22.0 20.7 26.4 25.0* 
*Minimum threshold 
Source: Calculations based on Table 3 data 
 
Compared with the foreign exchange earnings, in our opinion, the most 
important indicator as sustainability prerequisite, the ratio of MLT external debt 
rose above the threshold of 100 percent in 2009 and compared with the exports of 
goods and services the ratio stood well above the threshold of 150 percent. In this 
context, it should be noted that the export sector in Romania was one of the most 
affected by the global crisis in 2009, which had a direct impact on the decrease of 
foreign exchange earnings in this year.  
Even the proportion of international foreign exchange reserves in GDP 
increased from 12.9 percent to over 25 percent in the period under review, 
compared with the external debt, they felled for the first time below 50 percent in 
2009. 
Regarding the international reserves it should outlined, however, that their 
lack of immediate liquidity, in the case of Romania, implies a certain deficit of 
their relevance in the analysis of external debt sustainability. These reserves are 
largely invested in government bonds issued by developed countries (including the 
Treasury of USA), with an uncertain market value under the circumstances of 
international financial crisis and the volatility of capital markets.  
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The ratio between the external debt service and the foreign exchange 
earnings reached 26 percent in 2009 (compared with 15 percent in 2000) and in 
relation to exports of goods and services it increased continuously during the 
considered period, reaching more than 31 percent in 2009. It is also noteworthy that 
the external debt per capita increased from only EUR 427 in 2000 to more than 
EUR 3000 in 2009, which represents already a significant debt burden upon the 
population of Romania and of its future generations. 
The analysis of the indicators in terms of average annual growth rate during 
2001-2008, respectively 2001-2009, revealed that the degradation of the MLT 
external debt sustainability parameters has been caused by the exceeding of the 
external debt rate (23 percent annually), compared with the GDP real growth rate, 
respectively by about 17-18 percentage points, and the export of goods and services 
and forex earnings, by about 8-10 percentage points respectively (see Table 5). The 
comparison between the two periods of analysis has revealed that, although the 
year 2009 did not change the trends, it produced a shock upon the data series, 
especially concerning exports and forex earnings, with a differential of about 4 
percentage points between the two average annual growth rates.  
 
Table 5 
       Average annual growth rate of some indicators of MTL External  
       Debt Sustainability 
                                                                                                       - percent - 
Average annual growth  2001-2008 2001-2009 
MLT External Debt 23.4 23.8 
GDP real growth 6.2 4.6 
Exports of Goods & Services 15.7 11.8 
Forex Earnings 17.5 12.9 
       Source: Calculations based on Table 3 data 
 
The external debt of Romania was by far the indicator that has registered the 
highest growth rate during 2001-2009, compared with other outcome indicators 
such as GDP, exports and foreign exchange earnings. The ratio between the 
average growth rate of external debt and the average growth rate of GDP, exports 
and forex earnings was much higher during 2005-2009 than during 2001-2004, 
which relieve an unfavourable trend taking into account also the circumstances of 
international crisis (see Table 6).  
If this trend is going further it can bring growing difficulties and pressures 
generated by Romania’s external debt repayment upon economic growth, 




The ratio between the average annual growth rate of MLT external debt and 
those of GDP, exports of G&S and forex earnings of Romania in 2001-2009  
 
Indicators 2001-2009 2001-2004 2005-2009 
MLT external debt /GDP 5.17 2.87 8.35 
MLT external debt /Exports of 
G&S 
2.02 1.31 2.75 
MLT external debt /Forex 
earnings 
1.84 1.18 2.54 
Source: Calculation based on Table 3 data. 
 
 Such gaps on the horizon of one decade reveals that the external financing 
attracted on medium and long term have not generated major technological changes 
to ensure sound economic structures and a healthy growth, these vulnerabilities of 
Romania becoming obvious in 2009 by the lack of resistance to the global crisis 
impact. In this context, it should be noted that the main component of MLT 
external debt was the private sector, whose share within total debt increased from 
about one third in 2000 to over two thirds in 2008. In 2009, under the 
circumstances of the foreign debt increase mainly due to the IMF loan (EUR 6.6 
billion), plus the increase of non-resident deposits to over EUR 7 billion, this share 
has declined somewhat, below 60 percent.       
Therefore, in the case of Romania, the accumulation of external debt mostly 
by the private sector has failed, at least for now, to generate effects ensuring a 
sustainable economic growth. Perhaps, this was due to the fact that, to a significant 
extent, the investments in this sector had a speculative component, focusing on the 
real estate, the secondary capital market, the banking sector, including non-resident 
deposits searching for the valuing the interest rate differential on the primary 
capital market. 
In assessing debt sustainability, several methodological issues have to be 
considered, including the ones that show an undervaluation of the debt size 
comparing with the official data. The world economy globalization, which 
favoured the liberalization and acceleration of goods and capital international 
flows, has been accompanied by the creation of significant statistical discrepancies, 
including external debt figures. In fact, Romania's foreign debt is greater than 
appears in the records of the National Bank of Romania (NBR), one of the 
explanation relying on the financing of Romanian companies (many with foreign 
capital majority) directly from foreign banks located abroad, which are beyond the 
international financial flows registered by the NBR. Although some of this 
financing are short-term loans (up to one year) others, more difficult to assess, but 
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anyway amounting to several billion of euro annually, have a maturity of more than 
one year, belonging then to the Romania's total foreign debt.  
Moreover, as specified in NBR statistics, the MLT external debt represents 
its stock in a given moment, not including all payments related to the debt 
repayments (interests, fees, penalties, etc.). Under the circumstances of missing 
information on foreign debt repayment schedule, if we add also the cross-border 
loans directly to Romanian companies that we have been mentioned before, it 
become obvious that, in reality, the payments related to the external debt are 
significantly higher than results from the official data. As a consequence, 
Romania's international financial position appears to be extremely fragile, 
remaining vulnerable to a rapid deterioration of the sustainability parameters under 
the spectrum of possible future shocks, the sovereign risk topping rather the 
speculative area, as anyway our country is qualified by the major rating agencies.  
Assuming a desirable good governance by implementing of appropriate 
economic, fiscal and monetary policies, supported by restoring the confidence of 
business environment, including substantial investments inflows, re-launching 
sectors with foreign exchange earnings potential (ITC, tourism and agriculture) 
able to help boosting the economic growth in a manner that would limit the MLT 
external debt increase, Romania could ensure the financing requirements mostly 
through its own sources, as an essential precondition for achieving the external debt 
sustainability. To the extent to which other indicators recover up to sustainable 
levels, one may hope that Romania is getting out of the significant risk of external 
payments problems in the time horizon of Euro Area accession. The external debt 
perspective under these circumstances based on IMF projection (2010b, p. 34) was 
estimated according to the regression equation (Figure 2): 
 
Y = -0.2763 x² + 9.107x – 10.135   (1) 
           where Y represents the MLT external debt and x represents the time (years  
1, 2…16). 
In the case when for various reasons a correction of the MLT external debt 
trend is does not happen, Romania’s external payments sustainability could 
significantly deviate from the IMF scenario. This alternative is more likely if 
pressures of the domestic debt accumulation due to the delay in the public sector 
adjustment are added and the international context remains adverse. Under these 
unfavourable circumstances, a possible alternative trend of the MLT external debt 
was estimated according to the regression equation: 
 
Y = 0.0677 x² + 5.1824x – 2.3324    (2) 
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As seen in the Figure 2, the MLT external debt sustainability would remain 
in the significant risk zone, i.e. of payment problems occurrence and of slippage in 




Perspectives of Romania's MLT external debt 
















































______   IMF Scenario        
- - - - -    Possible alternative trend (under unfavourable circumstances) 
      _ _ _ _  Series of MLT external debt (from 2010, the interval variation    
between IMF Scenario and the alternative possible trend) 
       
 
Considering that most of external debt belongs to the private sector and this 
is relieving the government and the central bank decision makers of any obligation 
in the appropriate management of sovereign debt risk would be a fatal error for 
Romania. Due to ST and MLT external debt inter-connections (which became 
obvious during the Spring of 2009, when the government had to borrow from 
international organizations in order to cover a huge demand, mostly private, on the 
foreign exchange market managed by the central bank) and to the financial links 
between private and public sectors (bailouts of strategic private companies by the 
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government, arrears in public works payments, accumulation of nonperforming 
loans in retail/corporate lending) huge debt services without foreseeable own 
sources of gap financing if the economy is not recovering to the extent of 
expectations create a heavy perspective of debt rollovers under more and more 
unfavourable conditions and implicitly on Romania’s external debt sustainability 
and sovereign risk increase.  
 
 6. EU structural funds, a pillar of debt sustainability?  
 
 The structural funds (including of cohesion) allocated to Romania from the 
EU budget for the programming period 2007-2013 are amounting to EUR 19.2 
billion, plus national co-financing (state budget, local budgets and private sector), 
amounting to around EUR 9 billion. The EU structural funds are implemented 
through five Sector Operational Programs (i.e. SOP, for: Transportation EUR 4.5 
billion; Human Resources Development EUR 3.4 billion; Increasing Economic 
Competitiveness EUR 2.5 billion; Administrative Capacity Development EUR 208 
million; Environment EUR 4.5 billion), Regional Operational Program (ROP, 
amounting to EUR 3.7 billion) and Operational Program for Technical Assistance 
(amounting to EUR 170 million).  
 Out of the total structural and cohesion funds allocated to Romania for the 
period 2007-2009, Romania's allocation stood for EUR 5.64 billion (representing 
about 24.14 billion lei). According to the official data of the Authority for 
Coordination of Structural Instruments (see Table 7), by the end of December 
2009, payments made to beneficiaries (reimbursements) amounted to 2.5 billion lei 
(around EUR 600 million), which means an EU funds absorption rate of 10.3 
percent, respectively a very low level. 
It should be noted that during nearly 3 years, in which Romania has 
contributed with more than EUR 3 billion to the Community budget, our country 
has managed to absorb only EUR 0.6 billion from EU structural funds, the status of 
net contributor (in a very unfavourable rate, i.e. of 6 / 1) is paradoxical for a 
country that has to catch up a significant development gap, whose time horizon 
seems to be removed.  
Within the operational programs structure, whether SOP Increasing 
Economic Competitiveness has registered an absorption rate of more than 16 
percent, in the case of SOP Human Resources Development the absorption rate 
stood for only about 6.5 percent. The SOP Transportation, which in terms of funds 
allocated is the most important, was not able to absorb more than 2.4 percent. Out 
of the 14,890 total projects submitted were approved only 3,888, i.e. only 1 out of 
4, which is far from the expectations. Out of the 7 operational programs, the OP 
Regional, SOP Increasing Economic Competitiveness and SOP Human Resources 
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Development concentrate about 94 percent of total approved projects, while 
compared to submitted projects for these programs the ratio is still 1 / 4.  
 
Table 7  
Structural fund absorption rate in Romania at the end of December 2009 
 

























Regional 5029.4 790.0 15.3 3110 916 715 
Environment 5511.9 777.7 14.0 141 48 64 





3124.7 513.7 16.4 5386 2069 1264 
Human 
Resources 





381.5 6.1 1.6 931 152 111 
Technical 
Assistance 
241.1 3.0 1.2 31 8 23 
TOTAL 24144.1 2511.3 10.3 14890 6528 3888 
*The difference between the projects submitted and rejected/approved is 
represented by the projects under assessment procedures.  
Source: Press release regarding the Situation at 31st December 2009 of projects 
submitted and approved, of contracts signed and payments reimbursed to 
beneficiaries, ACIS, January 19, 2010. 
 
The causes of this situation are multiple, starting from the endemic inability 
of potential beneficiaries to develop viable projects, the excessive bureaucracy of 
management authorities, the excess of zeal following the procedures, the long time 
and delays throughout evaluation - approval - signing financing contract - tendering 
- reimbursement - implementation, the lack of performance criteria for consulting 
firms, the deficiencies in contractual relations between different institutions at the 
central and local level, between them and the consulting firms, respectively the 
project beneficiaries etc.  
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During the year of crisis 2009, when the absorption of structural funds was 
supposed to be the priority no. 1, as included in the new government program, the 
absorption rate remained as low.  
Although an inter-ministry committee for the management of EU funds was 
set up in the beginning of 2009 under the Prime Minister coordination, with a 
weekly periodicity of meetings, in time, they became more rarely, until their 
complete disappearance during the summer.  
We can say that government authorities, including the line ministries with 
responsibilities in managing the structural funds did not meet their commitments 
and obligations, the weak measures taken or declared failing to attract and absorb 
these funds.  
Furthermore, instead of having the structural funds support the development 
projects that contribute to mitigating the effects of economic crisis, it was their low 
absorption rate that blocked the development of many projects, due to the financial 
deterioration of eligible parameters of economic agents.  
Also, the insufficient co-financing from the state budget (central and / or 
local) was caused by growing deficits. The large uncertainty degree of obtaining 
projects pre-financing from the banking system, which restricted credit conditions 
and increased its costs, changing the ex-ante financial parameters projects 
(calculated in lei) on the account of sharp domestic currency depreciation, led to 
the increased costs of implementation. All these were overlapped by the political 
crisis triggered in the autumn of 2009, which caused an institutional deadlock at the 
central and local government levels, including the Managing Authorities of 
European funds.  
We believe that, in the prospective of the years 2010-2013 the absorption of 
EU structural funds, including the recovery of allocations from previous years, is 
one of the pillars of the strategy to exit from the crisis. Regardless of the 
government political colour, the Romanian authorities have to make operational 
this key priority by decisive actions in order to remove blocking factors, many of 
whom are mentioned above.  
As far as our country will succeed to attract structural funds, in addition to 
project implementation effects on the real economy, they may contribute also to the 
recovery of Romania's external balance, directly by reducing the financial gap, but 
also indirectly by increasing the financial resources (of state and private sector), 
implicitly to the payment of outstanding debt.  
Under the circumstances of public deficit worsening and of budgetary 
constraints following the global crisis impact, both at EU and national levels, a 
review of operational programs is expected, which could add supplementary 
difficulties in increasing the structural funds absorption rate in the case of Romania. 
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 7. Concluding remarks  
 
The factors of debt sustainability are multiple, involving an adjustment of the 
economy not only by eliminating the weaknesses demonstrated by the  inability to 
absorb the global crisis adverse effects, but especially those that have remained for 
long.  
In our opinion, Romania would have entered anyway a financial crisis, given 
the rapid widening of external imbalances as a result of the accumulation trade and 
current account deficits, simultaneously with the increase of the needs to cover the 
financing gap through compensatory flows (foreign loans), as an effect of reducing 
the autonomous flows (FDI), to the extent of the depletion of privatizing assets. 
Paradoxically, the fall of the economy in 2009 under the global crisis effects has 
caused a sudden and abrupt adjustment of the current account deficit (fully covered 
by foreign investments in 2009, even if it was reduced by almost half compared 
with the previous year), but rushed the call to the IMF financial assistance in order 
to avoid Romania’s entry into a currency market crisis, which would have 
degenerated into a resuscitation of inflation and undermining the timetable for 
joining the Euro Area. 
As mentioned, these threats had existed before the surge of the global crisis, 
which only accelerated and accentuated the effects suffered by Romania, 
transformed into a real economic and financial shock: falling the industrial 
production, construction sector and exports, paralysing the primary capital market 
and high volatility on secondary capital market, freezing the real estate market, 
reducing the household consumption and rising the unemployment, etc. One of the 
few anchors who saved Romania from a financial wreck was the exchange rate, 
supported, as pointed out before, by the IMF loan.  
If the maintenance of the exchange rate is sustainable in the medium and 
long run there will still be a big dilemma regarding the Romanian economy. 
Through monetary and financial instruments as we saw in the previous national and 
international experiences, without substantial support in the real economy, we can 
live delusions of short term macro-stabilization and major disappointments on the 
medium and long run.  
Even if the delimitation of the causes that generated the economy sharp 
decline (i.e.: particular to Romania / of foreign origin) became impossible their 
overlapping being in fact frequent and extensive, it is obvious that, despite some 
performance criteria and indicative targets set by the agreement with the IMF, the 
hesitations and the lack of prompt and appropriate reactions of authorities to the 
challenges of the global crisis is the main factor in prolonging the serious situation 
of Romania and the uncertainties that hang over the immediate future.  
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The immobility of the Romanian economy management seems more clearly 
in evidence if it considers that at global and European levels, countries have 
adopted anti-crisis programs and measures, which essentially consisted of: 
stimulating the domestic demand; supporting the public investments; temporary 
introduction of financial incentives by fiscal relaxing on the entire  capital-salary-
consumption axis, sometimes accompanied by postponement or tax exemption; 
implementation of monetary incentives, primarily by reducing the benchmark 
interest rates by the central banks; harmonization of monetary policies for the 
purposes of the interest rate differential shrinkage, reducing the speculative cross-
border capital flows; financial state intervention for temporary acquisition of 
unconventional non-performing assets and massive injections of public capital to 
save important financial and banking institutions; protection of public deposits; 
additional social assistance programs for poor and unemployed people; voluntary 
restraint of government bonds sales; better regulation and supervision of the 
financial system through new capital adequacy standards, particularly for financial 
institutions with international ramifications.  
Finding that the economies of these countries have responded positively to 
these measures, in 2010 being recorded clear signals of recovery, the discussions 
between the world leaders of the G20, were focusing on the most appropriate "exit 
policy", i.e. the timing and procedures for withdrawing programs that support their 
economies, specific to crisis conditions (IMF, November 2009). Thus, there is a 
consensus on the fact that the "exit policy" should be correlated with the 
improvement of production in all these countries, without which adverse effects 
may occur, and that the coordination of these policies does not necessarily mean 
synchronizing their time. It was recommended that financial assistance should be 
withdrawn if and when economic fundamentals are restored, financial markets are 
stabilized, market mechanisms resume the functioning and market competition - 
somehow disturbed by the public interventions in financial and banking institutions 
- is restored.  
Besides their positive impact, most of anti-crisis measures implied state 
funds allocations which have significantly worsened the fiscal balance of many 
advanced countries, increasing the public debt levels and the related sovereign risk. 
In Romania many debt sustainability indicators currently exceed the warning 
levels.  
Given its features, Romania, which has to go through two stages in order to 
turn back on the economic growth path (recovery + rebound), respectively the 
nominal and real convergence with EU countries, must undertake actions aimed to 
support economic sectors in decline and the development of public works projects, 
sustaining the exports, as the main driver of foreign earnings growth, through 
appropriate trade, financial and banking tools, implementing measures of 
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institutional structural reform, effective restructuring of the economy, increasing 
the absorption rate of EU structural funds. The improvement in governance and 
debt management are expected to be essential in order to restore the financial 
balance of the country, the fiscal consolidation being a top priority action. The 
monetary policy could be of much help by reducing the benchmark interest rate of 
the central bank, reforming the forex reserves management, resuming the lending 
activity for businesses financing by the commercial banks, setting up a neutral 
authority for the supervision of primary capital market.  
Any positive results of these measures depend on the internal effort in order 
to achieve a sustainable economic growth but also on the external context recover - 
i.e. the sustainability of the global economic recovery, returning to the normal 
functioning of international capital markets - on the international oil and natural gas 
quotations and on the price of raw materials. 
Romania has a relatively high degree of international openness of the 
economy that has to be coupled with the efforts to sustained increase production 
and underdeveloped domestic market. For this reason, a program to end the crisis 
effects on Romania and to re-launch the sustainable growth should be aimed at 
short and medium term measures that contribute to strengthening the national 
sector of the Romanian economy by effectively using the opportunities arising from 
the global crisis itself through required restructuring that could limit the increase in 
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